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Abstract
Reputation mechanisms offer an efficient way of building the neces-
sary level of trust in electronic markets. In the absence of independent
verification authorities that can reveal the true outcome of a transaction,
market designers have to insure that it is in the best interest of the trading
agents to report the behavior in transactions truthfully. As opposed to
side-payment schemes that correlate a present report with future reports
submitted about the same agent, we present a mechanism that discovers
(in equilibrium) the true outcome of a transaction by analyzing the two
reports coming from the agents involved in the exchange. For two long-run
rational agents, we show that it is possible to design such a mechanism
that makes cooperation a stable equilibrium.
1 Introduction
The availability of ubiquitous communication through the Internet is driv-
ing the migration of business transactions from direct contact between
people to electronically mediated interactions. People interact electroni-
cally either through human-computer interfaces or even through programs
representing humans, so-called agents. In either case, no physical interac-
tions among entities occur and the systems are much more susceptible to
fraud and deception.
Traditional methods to avoid cheating, involving strong cryptography
and Trusted Third Parties (TTP’s) that overlook every transaction, are
very costly and sometimes even impossible to apply due to the complex-
ity and heterogeneity of the environment. The maintenance of the TTP’s
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can incur substantial costs, and network communities often have a strong
desire of being independent of any authorities, as illustrated by the suc-
cessful P2P systems.
Reputation mechanisms offer a novel and efficient way of ensuring the
necessary level of trust which is essential to the functioning of any market.
They are based on the observation that agent strategies change when we
consider that interactions are repeated: the other party will remember
past cheating, and changes its terms of business accordingly in the future.
In this case, the expected future gains due to future transactions in which
the agent has a higher reputation can offset the loss incurred by not cheat-
ing in the present transaction. This effect can be amplified considerably if
such reputation information is shared among a large population and thus
multiplies the expected future gains made accessible by honest behavior.
Existing reputation mechanisms enjoy huge success. Systems such as
eBay1 or Amazon2 implement successful reputation mechanisms which
are partly credited for the businesses’ success. Studies show that users
seriously take into account the reputation of the seller when placing their
bids in online auctions ([9]) and that despite the incentive of free ride,
feedback is provided in more than half of the transactions on eBay ([18]).
The major challenge associated with designing reputation mechanisms
is to ensure that truthful reports are gathered about the actual outcome
of the transaction. In a typical e-commerce transaction, e.g. an exchange
between a seller (he) and a buyer (she), the buyer is required to first
pay and then wait for the purchased good to be shipped to the intended
destination. While the payment of the buyer can be easily verified with the
authority intermediating the transaction (e.g. the credit card company),
it is very difficult to verify that the seller has indeed shipped the promised
good. We start from the assumption that the outcome of the transaction
(i.e. the seller has shipped or not the good) is only known to the parties
involved. Any reputation mechanism will therefore have information that
is distorted by the strategic interests of the reporters.
Most e-commerce environments do not make it rational for an agent
to report the truth. The private information of a buyer for example,
about the trustworthiness of a seller is often regarded as an asset which
should not be freely shared. Paying for the buyer’s reputation report
could overcome this inconvenient, however, no guarantee can be offered
that the information provided is also true.
Incentive compatibility can be assured if the side payment for a rep-
utation report is conditioned on the correlation with future reputation
reports (assumed to be true) submitted about the same seller. [16] and
[10] describe such schemes that make truth revelation a Nash equilibrium.
A problem with these schemes however, is that they require certain con-
straints on the behavior of the sellers and on the beliefs of the reporting
buyers: i.e. sellers have typed behavior, and the set of seller types to
which buyers assign positive probability is countable and contains at least
2 elements. Moreover, such schemes are vulnerable to the collusion of
reporting agents, they also make lying be a Nash equilibrium, and they
1www.ebay.com
2www.amazon.com
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are not robust against irrational buyers who lie from time to time.
In this paper we address the problem of honest feedback elicitation in
a more general setting in which sellers and buyers are assumed to behave
rationally. We base our findings on the key assumption that buyers also
have a persistent presence in the market. Even though most of the theo-
retical models proposed by the academic community studying reputation
mechanisms assume single shot buyers, we believe that it is more natural
to consider that buyers also keep returning to the same business partners
(sellers) during their lifetime. Human buyers definitely have this charac-
teristic and therefore software agents that act on behalf of humans should
also be modeled in a context of repeated interaction.
The single-shot buyer behavior is mainly motivated by the technical
difficulties associated with maintaining a persistent identity while trading
over multiple markets. As we will later show, our mechanism motivates
buyers to maintain their identity, thus further motivating the validity of
our long-run buyer assumption in the present context. Moreover, projects
like the ”Liberty Alliance” [14] address the technical problems by attempt-
ing to build a unified cross-market online identity which will make it even
easier for the buyers to be recognized in different markets.
The idea behind our mechanism is that long-run buyers can obtain a
better business deal if they develop a reputation for honestly reporting the
outcome of the transactions. Rational sellers will fear cheating on buyers
that have an established reputation as honest reporters (because the re-
sulting negative report will be believed by the community and will affect
the future revenues of the seller) and therefore a cooperative equilibrium
can be achieved in which the reputable buyer obtains a better payoff than
the rational buyer who submits the reputation reports that maximize a
momentary side payment function.
More concretely, we propose a side payment scheme and a decision
rule which determines the outcome of a transaction by correlating the
two binary reports (cooperation or defection) coming from the buyer and
the seller involved in that transaction. For one round, three cases are
possible:
1. The seller admits having defected. Regardless of the buyer’s report,
we can conclude in this case that the seller indeed defected. For
a seller, falsely acknowledging defection implies a double loss (i.e.
the future loss due to a negative reputation report, and the mo-
mentary loss coming from not taking the opportunity of defecting)
and therefore no rational seller will report defection without actually
defecting.
2. Both agents report cooperation. In this case a cooperative outcome
can be recorded for the transaction in question if we make it impos-
sible for the seller to bribe the buyer into untruthfully submitting a
cooperative report.
3. The seller claims cooperation while the buyer reports defection. In
this case, we can only be sure that one of the agents is lying. Since
untruthful reporting is what we seek to avoid, both agents will be
punished in this case: a negative report is being recorded for the
seller, and both the buyer and the seller are fined for lying.
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By following the above described protocol, we show that for a long-run
buyer it is more profitable in some circumstances to report the truth, even
when that means withstanding the momentary fine due to a situation in
which the seller cheated but reported cooperation. This apparently ir-
rational behavior of the buyer determines the seller to change his future
behavior due to the threat that every unconfessed defection will be met
with hostility by a buyer who probably always reports the truth. In equi-
librium, we show that there is a finite upper bound on the number of times
a rational seller is willing to defect and also report cooperation, which in
turn, determines an upper bound on the number of non-cooperative trans-
actions between two long-run agents.
Section 2 presents the related work, Section 3 describes the assump-
tions that we make about the environment, the mechanism itself, and a
game-theoretic analysis of the repeated interaction between a seller and
a buyer using our mechanism. Section 4 presents some open issues of the
presented mechanism and directions for future work. Finally, Section 5
concludes our work.
2 Related Work
The notion of trust is used to refer to a subjective decision making process
that takes into consideration a diversity of factors. The Social Auditor
Model [11] is one of the existing models that explain how humans take
trust decisions by using a set of rules. One of the input information
that is often used in a trust decision making process is the reputation
of the partner. Reputation can be regarded as a unitary appreciation of
the personal attributes of the trustor: competence, benevolence, integrity
and predictability. [17] presents an extensive classification of reputation
by the means of collecting it.
Theoretic research on Reputation Mechanisms started with the three
seminal papers of Kreps, Milgom, Wilson and Roberts [12, 13, 15] who
introduced the reputation effect, i.e. preference of agents to develop a rep-
utation for a certain ”type”. A type is an apparently 3 irrational behavior
that obeys some exact rules: e.g. an agent that cooperates all the time in
a repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma game is said to have a cooperative type.
If a player (player one) is convinced that her opponent (player two) has
a certain type, she will divert from playing the equilibrium strategy to
playing a best-response strategy against the opponent’s type. This new
equilibrium might give player two a higher payoff than the initial one; it
is therefore rational for player two to build a reputation for a certain type
(commitment type) in order to eventually convince player one to play a
best response strategy against her commitment type. Building a reputa-
tion involves some costs (as player one might not easily accept to revert
to a best-response strategy) which have to be outrun by the future pay-
offs obtained when the reputation becomes credible. As a consequence,
3Typed behavior can be rationally explained by the existence of different payoff matrixes
for the players of the same game. What seems rational for one agent (with one payoff matrix)
might seem totally irrational for another agent having a different payoff matrix
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the reputation effect exists only in a certain class of games, with players
meeting certain criteria.
Fudenberg and Levine [7] study the class of all repeated games in
which a long-run player faces a sequence of single-shot opponents who
can observe all previous games. Based on the reputation effect, if the
long-run player is sufficiently patient and the single-shot players have a
positive prior belief that the long-run player might be a commitment type,
the authors derive a lower bound on the payoff received by the long-run
player in any Nash equilibrium of the repeated game. This result holds
for both finitely and infinitely repeated games, and it is robust against
further perturbations of the information structure (i.e. it is independent
of what other types may exist with positive probability).
Schmidt [20] provides a generalization of the above result for the two
long-run player case in a special class of games called of ”conflicting in-
terests”, when one of the players is sufficiently more patient than the op-
ponent. A game is of conflicting interests when the commitment strategy
of one player (player one) holds the opponent (player two) to his minimax
payoff – [20], Definition (1). The author derives an upper limit on the
number of rounds player two will not play a best response to player one’s
commitment type, which in turn generates a lower bound on player one’s
equilibrium payoff.
[1, 2] describe computational trust mechanisms based on direct interaction-
derived reputation. Agents learn to trust their partners, which increases
the global efficiency of the market. However, the time needed to build the
reputation information prohibits the use of this kind of mechanisms in a
large scale online market.
A number of reputation mechanisms also take into consideration indi-
rect reputation information, i.e. information reported by peers. [19, 21,
22] use social networks in order to obtain the reputation of an unknown
agent. Agents ask their friends, who in turn can ask their friends about the
trustworthiness of an unknown agent. Recommendations are afterwards
aggregated into a single measure of the agent’s reputation. This class of
mechanisms, however intuitive, does not provide any rational participa-
tion incentives for the agents. Moreover, there is little protection against
untruthful reporting, and no guarantee that the mechanism cannot be
manipulated by a malicious provider in order to obtain higher payoffs.
Dellarocas [5] presents an efficient binary reputation mechanism that
encourages a cooperative equilibrium in an environment of purely rational
buyers and sellers. The mechanism is centralized, it works for single-value
transactions, however, the buyers do not have any incentives to provide
feedback.
A decentralized reputation mechanism is presented in [10]. Reputation
feedback is collected, aggregated and disseminated by some specialized
agents who are independent. For agents whose behavior can be modeled
by a ”dynamic type”, the authors describe a side payment scheme that
makes it rational for agents to truthfully report their observations.
In the same group of work that addresses the necessary property of
incentive compatibility, we mention [3, 4, 16]. [3] considers exchanges of
goods for money and proves that a market in which agents are trusted
to the degree they deserve to be trusted is equally efficient as a mar-
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ket with complete trustworthiness. By scaling the amount of the traded
product, the authors prove that it is possible to make it rational for sellers
to truthfully declare their trustworthiness. Truthful declaration of one’s
trustworthiness eliminates the need of reputation mechanisms and signif-
icantly reduces the cost of trust management. However, the assumptions
made about the trading environment (i.e. the form of the cost function
and the selling price which is supposed to be smaller than the marginal
cost) are not common in most electronic markets.
For e-Bay like auctions, the Goodwill Hunting mechanism [4] provides
a way in which the sellers can be made indifferent between lying or truth-
fully declaring the quality of the good offered for sale. Momentary gains or
losses obtained from misrepresenting the good’s quality are later compen-
sated by the mechanism who has the power to modify the announcement
of the seller. To our knowledge this is the best reputation mechanism for
multi-value transactions.
A significant contribution towards eliciting honest reporting behavior
is made in [16]. The authors propose scoring rules as payment functions
which induce rational honest reporting. The scoring rules however, cannot
be implemented without accurately knowing the parameters of the agents’
behavior model, which can be a problem in real-world systems. Moreover,
this mechanism can be used only when agents have typed behavior.
3 Reporting Truthful Reputation Infor-
mation
3.1 Assumptions
We consider an environment in which the following assumptions hold:
• A rational seller interacts repeatedly with several rational buyers by
trading one good of value vi in each round i. The values vi ∈ (v, v)
are randomly distributed according to the probability distribution
function φ 4;
• All transactions have a fixed profit margin equal to (ρB + ρS)vi,
where ρSvi is the profit of the seller and ρBvi is the profit of the
corresponding buyer;
• All buyers are completely trustworthy: i.e. Each buyer first pays the
seller and then waits for the seller to ship the good. The seller may
defect by not shipping the promised good, and the buyer perfectly
perceives the action of the seller;
• There is no independent verification authority in the market, i.e. the
behavior of the seller in round i is known only to the seller himself
and the buyer with which he traded in that round;
• The seller cannot refuse the interaction with a specific buyer, and
can trade with several buyers in parallel. A buyer can however end
4Following the same argumentation proposed in [4], this model is valid for settings where
the act of accumulating inventory is independent from that of (re)selling it: e.g. a highly
dynamic used car dealership.
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the interaction with the seller and choose to buy the goods from a
completely trusted seller (e.g. a brick and mortar shop) for an extra
cost representing a percentage (θ) of the value of the item bought.
Once a buyer decides to terminate a business relationship with the
seller, she will never trade again in this market. The seller, however,
can always find other buyers to trade with.
• The buyer and the seller discount future revenues by δB and δS
respectively. The discount factors also reflect the probability with
which the agents are going to participate to the next transaction.
0 < δS , δB < 1, and δS >> δB modeling the fact that the seller is
likely to have a longer presence in the market than the buyer.
• The buyer and seller interact in a market (possibly a different one for
each transaction) capable of charging listing fees and participation
taxes.
• At the end of every transaction, both the seller and the buyer are
asked to submit a binary report about the seller’s behavior: a pos-
itive report, R+, signals cooperation while a negative report, R−,
signals defection;
We also assume that in our environment there is a semantically well
defined, efficient Reputation Mechanism (RM). Reputation is semanti-
cally well defined when buyers have exact rules for aggregating feedback
into reputation information and for making trust decisions based on that
reputation information. These rules determine sellers to assign a value to
a reputation report (R+ or R−), reflecting the influence of that report
on future revenues. RM is efficient if the values associated by sellers to
reputation reports are such that in any transaction the seller prefers to
cooperate rather than defect. If V (R+, v) and V (R−, v) are the values
associated by the seller to the positive respectively the negative reputa-
tion report generated after a transaction of value v, we have: V(R+, v)
+ Payoff(cooperate,v) > V(R−, v) + Payoff(defect,v)5. A simple escrow
service or Dellarocas’ Goodwill Hunting Mechanism [4] satisfy these prop-
erties.
As the influence of reputation on the seller’s future revenues can be
isolated into a concrete value for each reputation report, every interaction
between a seller and a particular buyer can be strategically isolated and
considered independently. A rational seller will maximize his revenues in
each such isolated interaction.
When perfect feedback (i.e. true and accurate) is available, a well-
defined, efficient RM is enough to make rational sellers cooperate. Un-
fortunately, perfect feedback cannot be assumed. In the absence of in-
dependent verification means, we can only rely on the subjective reports
submitted by the agents involved in the transaction; reports which are
obviously biased by the strategic interests of the agents.
In the rest of this section we describe a mechanism that in equilibrium
obtains true feedback about the outcome of the transaction by correlating
the seller’s and buyer’s reports about that transaction.
5as an abuse of notation, we will sometimes use V (R+, v) = V (R+) and ignore the fact
that the value of a reputation report also depends on the value of the good.
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3.2 The Mechanism
Every round i, a seller offers for sale a good of value vi. The market
charges the seller a listing fee εS , and advertises the good to the buyer.
The buyer pays a participation tax εB , to the market, and the price vi
to the seller. If the seller cooperates, he ships the good directly to the
buyer; otherwise the seller keeps the payment for himself and does not
ship the good. After a certain deadline, the transaction is considered as
over, and the market starts collecting information about the behavior of
the seller. The seller is first required to submit a report. If the seller
admits having defected, a negative report (R−) is submitted to the RM,
the listing fees εS and εB are returned to the rightful owners, and the
protocol is terminated. If, however, the seller claims to have cooperated,
the buyer is also asked to provide a report. At this moment, the buyer
can report cooperation, report defection, or she can report defection and
terminate the interaction with the seller.
If the buyer reports cooperation, a positive reputation report (R+) is
submitted to the RM, and the listing fees εS and εB are returned. If the
buyer reports defection, both players will be punished as one of them is
surely lying: a negative report (R−) is submitted to RM, and the listing
fees εS and εB are confiscated. Finally, if the buyer decides to terminate
the interaction, a negative report (R−) is submitted to RM, and the fees
εS and εB are confiscated. Figure 1 provides a schematic description of
the trading protocol of each round, i.
From game theoretic point of view, the above described protocol can
be modeled by the extensive-form game G = (N, (Ai), (%i), T ), shown
in Figure 2. N = {S,B} is the set of players, the seller and the buyer
respectively, AS = {CcS , CdS , DcS , DdS} is the action set of the seller,
AB = {cB , dB} is the action set of the buyer, %S is the preference relation
of the seller over the set of possible outcomes, %B is the preference relation
of the buyer over the set of possible outcomes, and T is the player function,
or the “turn” function which prescribes which player should make the next
move after every possible game history. Let also AS and AB denote the
set of all mixed strategies in G. An action profile a is a tuple (aS , aB)
such that aS ∈ AS and aB ∈ AB .
The outcome for the buyer is indicated as a single real value represent-
ing the buyer’s payoff in the current round. The outcome for the seller
is indicated as a tuple (X;P ), where X ∈ {R+, R−} represents the filed
reputation report (positive or negative), and P ∈ R is the payoff obtained
by the seller in the current transaction. The buyer’s preference relation
%B is the “≥” relation over the set of real numbers. We assume that the
seller’s preference relation %S has the following properties:
1. (X;P1) %S (X;P2) for X ∈ {R+, R−} and P1 ≥ P2
2. (R+; ρSvi) %S (R−; (1 + ρS)vi) for any vi
While the first property is driven by common sense, the second prop-
erty is guaranteed by the efficient reputation mechanism present in the
market.
We further assume that the preference relations of the players can
be described by a payoff function. Let oi(aS , aB) be the outcome for
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1. The seller offers for sale a good of value vi.
2. The market charges the seller a listing fee εS and posts the product for sale. εS
is the lying fine imposed by the market to the seller if contradictory reports are
submitted.
3. The buyer pays vi to the seller and the tax εB to the market. εB is the lying
fine imposed by the market to the buyer if contradictory reports are submitted.
4. The seller decides whether or not to ship the good (i.e. whether to cooperate or
defect). If the seller cooperates, he ships the good directly to the buyer.
5. The market requests the seller to submit a binary report (cS for cooperation or
dS for defection) about his own behavior in the current round.
6. If the seller reports dS , a negative report R− is sent to the RM, and the market
pays εB to the buyer and εS to the seller. The transaction is completed.
7. If the seller reports cS , the market asks the buyer to submit a report. The buyer
can report cooperation (cB), defection (dB) or she can quit the game (out).
8. If the buyer reports cB , a positive report R+ is sent to the RM, and the market
pays εS to the seller and εB to the buyer. The transaction is completed.
9. If the buyer reports dB , a negative report R− is sent to the RM, and the market
pays nothing to either the seller or the buyer.
10. If the buyer decides to quit the game, a negative report R− is sent to the RM,
and the market pays nothing to either the seller or the buyer.
Figure 1: Description of the transaction protocol.
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Figure 2: Game G modeling the one-round interaction protocol.
player i ∈ {S,B} in G, when the seller plays aS ∈ AS and the buyer plays
aB ∈ AB . The payoff function gi of player imaps outcomes to real number
payoffs: gi[oi(aS , aB)] ∈ R represents the payoff for player i corresponding
to the outcome oi. A payoff profile v(a) corresponding to the action profile
a = (aS , aB) is the tuple (vS , vB) such that vS = gS(oS(aS , aB)) and
vB = gB(oB(aS , aB)).
For the buyer, the mapping from outcomes to payoffs is straightfor-
ward. For the seller, we assume that:
• gS [(X;P )] = V (X) + P for any X ∈ {R+, R−} and P ∈ R;
• gS [(R+; ρSvi)] = gS [(R−; (1 + ρS)vi)] + ² where ² > 0, according to
the second property of the seller’s preference relation %S .
The repeated transaction between the seller and one buyer can be
modeled by a T -fold repetition of the stage game G, denoted GT , where
T might be finite or infinite. In this paper we will deal with the infinite
horizon case, however, the results obtained can be applicable with minor
modifications to finitely repeated games as well if T is large enough.
In the repeated game, player i obtains the average discounted payoff:
Vi = (1− δi)
T∑
τ=0
δτi g
τ
i ; (1)
where δi denotes her (his) discount factor, and g
τ
i is the payoff obtained
by player i in round τ .
We define the average continuation payoff for player i from period t
onward (and including period t) as:
V ti = (1− δi)
T∑
τ=t
δτ−ti g
τ
i ; (2)
10
After each round, both players perfectly perceive the action of the
opponent. They have perfect recall and can condition their play on the
entire past history of the game. We denote by ht a specific history of the
repeated game out of the setHt = (AS×AB)t of all possible histories up to
and including period t. A pure strategy si of player i in the repeated game
is a sequence of maps sti : H
t−1 → Ai. Correspondingly, let σi denote a
mixed strategy of player i, where σti : H
t−1 → Ai. By V ti (σS , σB) we
denote the overall payoff for player i obtained from period t onward (and
including period t) if the seller follows the strategy σS and the buyer
follows the strategy σB .
3.3 Equilibrium Analysis
For discounted infinitely repeated games with perfect information, the
Folk Theorem [8] guarantees that every enforceable outcome (i.e. feasible
and individually rational) can be obtained by a subgame perfect equi-
librium (SPE) strategy profile when the discount factors are big enough.
The results of this theorem do not apply directly to the game G∞ because
in every round t we allow the buyer to quit the game.
When the buyer terminates an interaction with a seller (chooses out
in round t), she obtains a continuation payoff equal to:
Vˆ t+1B = (1− δB)
∞∑
τ=t+1
δτ−t−1B vτ (ρB − θ);
If we denote by v˜ the average value of a transaction, the expected value
of Vˆ t+1B is:
E[Vˆ t+1B ] = v˜(ρB − θ);
Any SPE strategy profile must give the buyer at least Vˆ t+1B after every
round t (otherwise the buyer can profitably deviate to out in round t). The
minimum continuation payoff of the buyer is therefore:
V tB = (1− δB)(−vt − εB) + δBVˆ t+1B ; (3)
A payoff profile vˆ = (vˆS , vˆB) dominates another payoff profile v =
(vS , vB) if it is better for at least one of the players and not worse for
any of the players: i.e. there is i ∈ {S,B} such that vˆi > vi and for all
j ∈ {S,B} \ i, vˆj ≥ vj .
We restrict our attention to SPE strategies of G∞ which are not domi-
nated. A SPE strategy s is not dominated if there is no other SPE strategy
sˆ such that the the payoff profile generated by sˆ dominates the payoff pro-
file generated by s in G∞. The intuition behind this assumption is that
no player will choose to play a SPE strategy as long as there is another
SPE strategy which can bring him a higher payoff while not decreasing
the payoff of the opponent.
The above restriction limits the set of SPE strategies to the ones gen-
erating an equilibrium path containing a mixture of the action profiles
(CcS , cB) and (DcS , cB).
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Lemma 1 All not dominated SPE strategies prescribe only the action
profiles (CcS , cB) and (DcS , cB) on the equilibrium path in G
∞.
Proof. Observe that any payoff profile in G is dominated by one of the
payoff profiles corresponding to the action profiles (CcS , cB) or (DcS , cB),
i.e. v(CcS , cB) and v(DcS , cB) respectively.
Let s be a not dominated SPE strategy in G∞ which prescribes for
round t an action profile a other than (CcS , cB) or (DcS , cB) with positive
probability. From s we construct strategy s′ by replacing the action profile
a in round t by the action profile a′ ∈ {(CcS , cB), (DcS , cB)} such that
v(a′) dominates v(a) in G. This replacement is possible because of the
above observation. Moreover, the payoff generated by s′ dominates the
payoff generated by s.
We can show that s′ is a SPE strategy in G∞ by proving that there
is no profitable one stage deviation for any of the players. Suppose that
there is a profitable one stage deviation for player i from s′. Because of
the way s′ is constructed, any one stage deviation from s′ is equally or
less profitable than the corresponding one stage deviation from s. There-
fore, the assumed one stage deviation will also be profitable for i in s.
Contradiction. Thus s is dominated. ¥
Let s be a mixed strategy profile such that with probability p the play-
ers play (DcS , cB) and with probability (1−p) the players play (CcS , cB).
The expected continuation payoff of the buyer is:
E[V t+1B ] = E
[
(1− δB)
∞∑
τ=t
δτ−tB [p(−vτ ) + (1− p)ρBvτ ]
]
;
= v˜(ρB − p− ρBp); (4)
When playing in round t, the buyer knows which of the action profiles
(CcS , cB) or (DcS , cB) are prescribed by the strategy s, and therefore the
continuation payoff of the buyer is:
V tB |(CcS ,cB) = (1− δB)ρBvt + δBV t+1B ;
V tB |(DcS ,cB) = (1− δB)(−vt) + δBV t+1B ;
(5)
depending on what s prescribes for round t. Since both V tB |(CcS ,cB) and
V tB |(DcS ,cB) have to be greater or equal to V tB , the maximum value of p
is:
p ≤ p = (1− δB)εB + δB v˜θ
δB v˜(1 + ρB)
; (6)
The upper bound on p limits the maximum attainable payoff, V S of
the seller in G∞:
V
t
S = (1− δS)
∞∑
τ=t
δτ−t[pvτ + (1− p)ρSvτ + V (R+)];
which has an expected value: E[V
t
S ] = V (R+) + pv˜(1 − ρS) + v˜ρS . By
replacing (6) we obtain:
V
t
S = V (R+) + v˜ρS + v˜(1− ρS) (1− δB)εB + δB v˜θ
δB v˜(1 + ρB)
;
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For any p ∈ [0, p] the strategy s can be made a SPE of G∞ by adding
minimax threats.6. Let us observe that when p = 0 our mechanism en-
forces the cooperative outcome and is incentive compatible. More pre-
cisely, our mechanism admits a SPE equilibrium in which the reputation
mechanism collects only accurate feedback. Unfortunately, this equilib-
rium is not unique, and we can only guarantee that the maximum per-
centage of false reports is p.
Following the ideas from [12], [7] and [20] we can limit the set of SPE
strategies to a more desirable subset (i.e. consisting of those strategies
which generate mainly true reputation reports and outcomes as close as
possible to the socially efficient one) if we introduce a small amount of
uncertainty in the perfect information game G∞.
A buyer who could commit to the “honest reporting” strategy, s∗B =
(play cB after CcS and dB after DcS), would benefit from cooperative
trade. The seller’s best response against s∗B is to play action CcS repeat-
edly, which leads the game into the socially efficient outcome. Unfortu-
nately, under perfect information, the buyer’s commitment for s∗B is not
credible: when actually asked to play cB or dB a rational seller prefers to
play cB .
However, if the seller has incomplete information in G∞ (i.e. he be-
lieves that he might be facing a buyer who prefers to play the commitment
strategy s∗B) we show that it is possible for a rational buyer to build a
reputation for playing as the commitment type. When the reputation
becomes credible, the seller is convinced that the opponent buyer is play-
ing as if she were committed to playing s∗B and therefore switches to the
best response strategy against s∗B , i.e. the cooperative equilibrium. As
an effect of reputation building, the set of equilibrium points is reduced
to a set of points which are close to the socially efficient one, and which
generate truthful reputation reports on the equilibrium path.
Formally, imperfect information can be modeled by a perturbation
of the complete information repeated game G∞ such that in period 0
(before the first round of the game is played) the “type” of the buyer is
drawn by nature out of a countable set Ω = {ω0, ω1, . . .} according to
the probability measure µ. The buyer’s payoff now additionally depends
on her type. We say that in the perturbed game G∞(µ) the seller has
incomplete information because he is not sure about the true type of the
buyer.
Two types from Ω have particular importance:
• The “normal” type of the buyer, denoted by ω0, is the rational buyer
who has the payoffs presented in Figure 2.
• The “commitment” type of the buyer, denoted by ω∗, always prefers
to play the commitment strategy s∗B .
In Theorem 1 we give an upper bound kS on the number of times the
seller is willing to play the action DcS in G
∞(µ), given that he always
observes the commitment strategy played by the buyer.
6Therem 1 in [8] explains how the strategy can be built
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The intuition behind this result is the following. The seller’s best re-
sponse to the commitment type buyer is to always cooperate and report
cooperation, i.e. (CcS), which gives the commitment type buyer her max-
imum attainable payoff in G∞(µ), corresponding to the socially efficient
outcome. The seller however would be better off by playing against the
normal type buyer. As we have seen above, against the normal type buyer,
the seller can get more than the cooperative outcome by randomizing be-
tween the (CcS , cB) and (DcS , cB) action profiles.
A normal type buyer can be distinguished from a commitment type
buyer only if the seller plays DcS . In this situation, the normal type
buyer prefers to play cB , while the commitment type buyer prefers to
play dB . The normal type buyer could however simulate the strategy of
a commitment type buyer in order to obtain the payoff of the latter (i.e.
the cooperative outcome).
Because the cooperative strategy involves a loss for the seller (i.e. the
potential loss of not being able to get the higher payoff that could be
obtained against the normal buyer) the seller should not become “easily”
convinced that he is playing against a commitment type buyer. The ques-
tion is therefore, how long should the seller try to determine the true type
of the buyer. Because every outcome (DcS , cB) (i.e. the seller tests the
type of the buyer and the buyer plays the commitment strategy) generates
a loss for the seller, and because the seller cannot wait infinitely for future
payoffs (the seller’s discount factor is less than 1) it follows that at some
point, if the seller always observes the commitment strategy being played
by the buyer, he must give up trying to test the true type of the buyer,
and accept playing a best response against the commitment type buyer.
Before we proceed, we restate an important lemma of Fudenberg and
Levine [7] about statistical inference. The lemma proves that if ω∗ has
positive probability and if the seller observes s∗B being played in every
round, then there is a fixed finite upper bound on the number of time
the seller will believe s∗B is unlikely to be played. The intuition behind
this result is the following: if the seller believes that s∗B will be played in
the next round with probability less than pi, every time he observes s∗B
he is slightly surprised and therefore will update his beliefs accordingly.
Because the commitment type of the buyer chooses s∗B with probability
1, while the seller expects the buyer to choose s∗B with probability smaller
than pi, it follows from Bayes’ Law that the seller’s update of his belief
of facing a commitment type buyer, is strictly greater than 0. However,
this cannot happen arbitrarily often because the updated probability of
the commitment type cannot become bigger than 1. This gives an upper
bond on the number of periods in which the seller may expect s∗B to be
played with probability less than pi.[20]
Formally, any (possibly mixed) strategy profile (σS , σB) induces a
probability distribution pi over the set of histories (AS×AB)∞×Ω. Given
a history ht−1, let pit(s∗B) be the probability attached by the seller to the
event that the commitment strategy s∗B is being played in period t. Since
ht−1 is a random variable, so is pit(s∗B). Fix any pi, 0 ≤ pi < 1 and consider
any history h induced by (σS , σB). Along this history, let n(pi
t(s∗B) ≤ pi)
be the number of random variables pit(s∗B) for which pi
t(s∗B) ≤ pi. Again,
since h is a random variable, so is n.
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Lemma 2 Let 0 ≤ pi < 1. Suppose µ(ω∗) = ω∗ and that (σS , σB) are
such that Prob(h ∈ H∗|ω∗) = 1, where H∗ is the set of all histories in
which the buyer always plays s∗. Then:
Prob
[
n(pit(s∗B) ≤ pi) > lnµ
∗
lnpi
| h ∈ H∗
]
= 0.
Furthermore, for any infinite history h such that the truncated histories
ht all have positive probability and such that s
∗
B is always played, µ(ω
∗|ht)
is nondecreasing in t.
Proof. See Fudenberg and Levine, [7], Lemma 1 ¥
This lemma does not prove that the seller will become convinced that
he is facing a commitment type buyer. It simply proves that after a finite
number of rounds the seller becomes convinced that the buyer is playing
as if she were a commitment type.
Theorem 1 If:
1. the seller has incomplete information in G∞,
2. the seller assigns positive probability to the prior beliefs that the buyer
is a “commitment” type and a “normal” type. i.e. µ(ω0) > 0,
µ∗0 = µ(ω
∗) > 0 and µ(ω0) + µ(ω∗) = 1;
Then there is a finite upper bound ks on the number of times the seller
plays DcS in G
∞.
Proof. In proving this theorem, we will first show that a rational seller
does not choose action DcS in any round in which he believes that the
buyer will play dB in GD with a probability greater than a certain thresh-
old. Having this threshold, we use Lemma 2 to derive an upper bound on
the number of rounds in which the seller might play DcS .
Let µ∗t be the probability of the belief the seller has before round t
that he is facing a commitment type buyer. Let also pit be the probability
assigned by the seller to the event that the buyer is going to play the
commitment strategy s∗B in round t, such that pit ≥ µ∗t . Let V tS(µ∗t )
denote the expected continuation payoff of the seller prior to round t.
In round t the seller has to choose between playing CcS orDcS (actions
DdS and CdS are strictly dominated by CcS). When playing CcS , the
seller expects with certainty to obtain the outcome (CcS , cB), however,
since both the rational and the commitment type will play cB in this
situation, he does not get any information about the type of the buyer.
His expected payoff in this case is:
E[V tS(µ
∗
t )|CcS ] = (1− δS)gS(R+; ρSvt) + δSE[V t+1S (µ∗t )] (7)
If the seller chooses to play DcS , he expects with probability pit that
the buyer will play dB and with probability (1 − pit) that the buyer will
reveal to be a normal type who plays cB . Against the normal type, the
seller can expect a continuation payoff of maximum V
t+1
S . Therefore:
E[V tS(µ
∗
t )|DcS ] ≤ pit
[
(1− δS)gS(R−; vt − εS) + δSE[V t+1S (µ∗t+1)]
]
+ (1− pit) ·
[
(1− δS)gS(R+; vt) + δSV t+1S
]
;
(8)
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From Lemma 2 we know that µ∗t+1 = µ
∗
t /pit, the sequence µ
∗
t being
non-decreasing. When µ∗t = 0 the seller is convinced that the buyer
is a normal type, when µ∗t = 1 the seller is convinced that the buyer
is a commitment type. Moreover, since the seller can always increase
probability µ∗t to any value, it must be that:
V t+1S (0) ≤ V
t+1
S
V t+1S (1) = (1− δS)
∑∞
τ=t+1 δ
τ−t−1
S gS(R+; ρSvτ )
E[V tS(µ1)] < E[V
t
S(µ2)] for any µ1 > µ2;
(9)
A rational seller chooses DcS in round t only if E[V
t
S(µ
∗
t )|CcS ] <
E[V tS(µ
∗
t )|DcS ]. By replacing (7), (8) and (9) we obtain:
pit <
(1− δS)v(1− ρS) + δSΦ
(1− δS) [v(1− ρS) + ²+ εS ] + δSΦ = pi; (10)
where:
Φ = E[V t+1S (0)]− E[V t+1S (1)] = v˜(1− ρS)
(1− δB)εB + δB v˜θ
δB v˜(1 + ρB)
;
The seller will not choose action DcS in any round t in which pit > pi.
From Lemma 2 we know that there is a finite number of rounds in which
pit can be less than pi and as a consequence there is a finite number of
rounds in which the seller might plays DcS . This bound is given by:
kS =
⌈
ln(µ∗0)
ln(pi)
⌉
(11)
and depends on v, v˜, ², εS , εB , δS , δB , ρS , ρB , θ and µ
∗
0. ¥
The existence of kS further reduces the possible equilibrium payoffs a
buyer can get in G∞(µ). When a normal type buyer is asked to play the
action profile (DcS , cB) according to some SPE equilibrium strategy s, the
buyer can deviate to playing dB and mimic the commitment type buyer
(i.e. build a reputation for honestly reporting the behavior of the seller).
In the worst case, a normal type buyer who mimics the commitment type
will have to play kS times the (DcS , dB) action profile (until the seller
becomes convinced that the buyer is playing as if she were a commitment
type) followed by an infinite sequence of (CcS , cB) (played when the seller
is best responding to the commitment type buyer). In this case, the
continuation payoff of the normal type buyer is:
V ′tB = (1− δB)
[
(−vt − εB) + δB
t+kS−1∑
τ=t+1
δτ−t−1B (−vτ − εB)
+ δkSB
∞∑
τ=t+kS
δτ−t−kSB ρBvτ
]
;
Any equilibrium strategy in G∞(µ) must guarantee the normal type
buyer at least V ′tB . Let us reconsider the strategy s from the perfect
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information game G∞ according to which the players play (DcS , cB) with
probability p and (CcS , cB) with probability 1−p. By imposing that both
V tB |(CcS ,cB) and V tB |(DcS ,cB) (Equation (5)) be greater or equal to V ′tB ,
the maximum value of p is:
p ≤ p′ = (1− δB)εB + (δB − δ
kS
B )(v˜ + εB + v˜ρb)
δB v˜(1 + ρB
; (12)
However, the constraints on p presented in Equation (6) remain valid,
and therefore p ≤ min(p, p′).
Particular importance has the case in which kS = 1. p′ becomes:
p′ =
(1− δB)εB
δB v˜(1 + ρB
; (13)
and as εB can be any positive value, p′ will in the limit approach 0.
In this situation, the reputation mechanism will receive false reputation
reports with vanishing probability.
The result of Theorem 1 has to be interpreted as a worst case scenario.
In real markets, sellers that already have a small predisposition to cooper-
ate will defect fewer times. Moreover, the mechanism is self enforcing, in
the sense that the more buyers act as commitment types, the higher will
be the prior beliefs of the sellers that buyers will report truthfully, and
therefore the easier it will be for the buyers to act as truthful reporters.
The following properties are also straightforward to derive as a direct
consequence of Theorem 1:
Property 1 The mechanism is bounded socially efficient.
Sketch of Proof. Because of the lost exchange, outcome (DcS , cB)
generates a cumulated social loss of (ρS + ρB)vi every time it occurs.
The perfect information equilibrium involves a possibly infinite number of
rounds in which (DcS , cB) is played. By limiting the number of times the
seller is playing action D, we also limit to a finite number (i.e. kS) the
rounds in which the exchange does not occur. The social loss is therefore
bounded above by kS(ρS + ρB)v ¥
Property 2 The mechanism is weakly budget balanced
Sketch of Proof. The net payment to the mechanism is non-negative as
every time there is a disagreement concerning the two reputation reports,
the center gets εB + εS . By introducing supplementary service fees, the
mechanism can be easily transformed into one that yields profit to the
market. ¥
4 Open Issues
Further benefits can be obtained if the buyers’ reputation as honest re-
porters is shared within the market. A buyer that has once built a repu-
tation for truthfully reporting the seller’s behavior will benefit from coop-
erative trade during her entire lifetime, without having to convince each
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seller separately. Therefore the upper bound on the loss a buyer has to
withstand in order to convince a seller that she is a commitment type, be-
comes an upper bound on the total loss a buyer has to withstand during
her entire lifetime in the market. How to efficiently share the reputation
of buyers within the market remains an open issue.
Correlated with this idea is the observation that buyers that use our
mechanism are motivated to keep their identity. In generalized markets
in which agents are encouraged to play both roles (e.g. a peer-2-peer file
sharing market in which the fact that an agent acts only as ”seller” can be
interpreted as a strong indication of ”double identity” with the intention
of cheating) our mechanism also solves the problem signaled in [6] related
to the ease with which agents can change their online identity. The price
to pay for the new identity is the loss due to building a reputation as a
honest reporter when acting as a buyer.
The mechanism can be criticized for being centralized. The market
acts as a central authority by collecting listing fees from the seller and the
buyer, by asking the reputation reports at the end of each transaction,
and by reasoning about the outcome of the transaction. However, as the
mechanism does not require any information to be transmitted from one
round to another (the seller stores the reputation of the buyer) we could
have the same seller and buyer interact in multiple markets (decentralized
system) without having to relay on one single centralized institution.
Our mechanism is not robust against further perturbations of the in-
formation structure (i.e. other buyer types that can exist with positive
probability). The presence of ”crazy” buyer types for example, (i.e. buy-
ers who have a preference (or are indifferent) to reporting defection after
the seller cooperated and rightfully reported cooperation) and a particu-
lar set of beliefs of the seller, could determine him to also play action Cds
from time to time. Such an equilibrium can be sustained by the threat
that any deviation from the equilibrium will trigger in the ”crazy” buyer
a deviation to always denounce defection. The assumptions and prior
beliefs that can sustain such equilibria are quite un-natural, and there-
fore, highly unlikely to occur in real situations. See [20] Section 3 for a
discussion on how to build such equilibria.
One direction of future research is to study the behavior of the above
mechanism when there is two-sided incomplete information: i.e. the buyer
is also uncertain about the type of the seller. A seller type of particular
importance would be the ”greedy” seller type who always likes to keep
the partner buyer to a continuation payoff arbitrarily close to 0. In this
situation we expect to be able to find an upper bound kB on the number
of rounds in which a rational buyer would be willing to test the true type
of the seller. The condition kS < kB would impose the constraints on the
parameters of the system for which the reputation effect will work in the
favor of the buyer: i.e. the seller will give up first the ”psychological” war
and revert to a cooperative equilibrium.
A somehow related problem is the robustness to mistakes, or imperfect
monitoring of the opponent’s actions. A seller’s defection by mistake
in a situation in which it was not rational for a seller to defect will be
interpreted by the buyer as evidence of the seller’s irrational behavior. A
mechanism that can deal with two-sided incomplete information will be
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able to also address this issue.
Last, but not the least, we plan to adapt this truthful reporting mecha-
nism for reputation mechanism that affect the value of future transactions.
For such mechanisms the repeated interaction between a buyer and seller
is much more complicated to model. A negative report submitted by a
buyer at time t might lead to more beneficial trade for that buyer in the
future (since the negative reputation report will attract a decrease in the
price of future sold goods). Making it rational for the buyer to submit the
true report involves a detailed understanding of the underlying reputation
mechanism, the solution being most likely application dependent.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we describe a truth elicitation mechanism for two long-run
rational buyer and seller. The mechanism assumes the existence of a
market able to disseminate data and collect fees from both parties and
we rely on an efficient reputation mechanism to make it rational for the
seller to give up the momentary gain obtained from cheating in favor of a
positive reputation report. In the absence of any independent verification,
we describe a transaction protocol that correlates the reports coming from
the trading seller and buyer in order to determine the correct outcome of
the transaction. In equilibrium we show that our mechanism collects
false reputation reports with vanishing probability. As a consequence,
true reputation information is supplied to the reputation mechanist which
therefore enforces a cooperative equilibrium in the market.
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